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LIABILITIES OF THE EXTRA-LEGAL CENSOR
SCOPE
The question dealt with here is the liability, if any, of censors motivated by
moral as distinguished from political beliefs, viz., those groups which attempt
(generally successfully) to suppress literature through means other than resort to
the courts or mere persuasion by the exercise of free speech. Although the
actuating premises under which these groups operate are open to doubt,' this
question will not be touched upon. The purpose of this article is to point up the
many important problems involved in the sensitive area of extra-legal book
censorship.
THE PROBLEM
Because of the practical problems of prosecution under criminal auspices
the constitutional limitations of prior restraint,2 these groups have found refuge
through informal methods of suppression.3 This activity has evolved from
organized actions by groups to protect themselves from prejudice,4 such as action
by Jewish groups against Oliver Twist, Roman Catholic pressure aimed at The
Nation, and the Negro~s' resentment of The Birth of a Nation, to attempts to
protect others from moral degradation. 5 Movements have taken hold in many
cities.6 These groups are generally voluntary associations of public spirited citizens,
many times with a public official such as the Chief of Police in their midst or at
the helm. 7 The procedure generally is to compile a list of allegedly objectionable
books or to use one already compiled, i.e., the National Organization of Decent
Literature lists, and to send letters to storekeepers asking their "cooperation" in
removing these books. This request is fortified by making the latter aware of the
local ordinance against obscene literature. Next come check visits to the stores
and the rewarding to a cooperating store of a plaque or sticker to show compliance.
This reward is subject to be taken away upon future failure to cooperate. Where
the group is purely unofficial in nature (not having been organized or authorized
to act by the city or town, which would thus raise the problem of the delegability
of this police power and the protection of the United States Constitution first and
fourteenth Amendments) there is the overt threat of boycott and sometimes
prosecution. Where the group has official sanction, the threat of prosecution is
1.

DANIELS, THE CENSORSHIP OF BOOKS, 39-45 (1955).

2.

Near v. State of Minnesota 283 U. S. 697 (1931).

3. NoT=, 68 HARV. L. Rsv. 489 (1955).
4.

The Survey, March 1952, P. 115.
LocKHAmT & McCLURE, Literature, the Law of Obsenity and the Constitution 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 303-4, (1954).
6. 163 Publishers Weekly 1058 (Feb. 28, 1953); the list includes Detroit,
Baton Rouge, Oklahoma City and Youngstown.

5.

7. See New American Library of World Literature-v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823

(N. D, Ohio 1953).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
the main consideration.8 Cooperation is thus elicited: the small entrepreneur
generally has neither the money nor the courage to resist a criminal prosecution
or to institute a civil suit, to say nothing of loss of business which would result
from the mere accusation that he "sells dirty books to children."
THE QUESTION-WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Leaving aside the problem of what standards should be applied in deciding
that a book is obscene, a concept which the courts have not as yet fully defined,' 0
the question is what rights and remedies are possessed by society and the economically injured party, bookseller, distributor and publisher? Also involved here
are questions as to the rights of the group (usually children) whose protection is
sought. Do they or their parents have a right to choose the protectors? Do they
have a right not to be protected? Has the state or city by passing an obscene
literature statute set itself up as the sole protector under a preemption theory
or is there room for joint protection? If there is no preemption, who else then
may participate? Parent? Church? Civic groups?
THE STATE
The only remedy of the State would have to be found in the penal statutes.
It is possible that in some states the action of these groups inasmuch as they
involve group activity and threats in order to accomplish their aims, may be
indictable offenses under conspiracy or extortion statutes. If the book is actually
(by statutory and judicial standards), obscene, perhaps the compounding of crime
statutes would come into operation; the New York Penal law does not seem broad
enough to accomplish this.'"
THE INDIVIDUAL HARMED ECONOMICALLY
(A)

Prima Facie Tort

In its classic sense this is intentionally to do that which is calculated in the
ordinary course of events to damage and which does in fact, damage another in
8. This assumes that the individual against whom pressure is exerted knows
whether the group has official sanction or not. It is this writer's opinion that the
assumption generally is that the group is official since the group name generally
includes the name of the municipality inwhich the group is operating.

9. For a detailed study of the operation of these groups see LOCKHART &
McCLuRE, Op. cit. supra note 5 at 309-16.
10. LoCKHART & MCCLURE supra note 5, at 324-9.
11. N. Y. PENAL LAw 530, 570, 580 (5), 850 etc.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that person's property or trade, if done without just cause or excuse.12 The elements
are thus intent, damage and lack of justification.
The intent question is held to require, in the majority of jurisdictions, merely
the intent to do the act. No intent to injure the plaintiff is necessary; his damage
need only be an inevitable concomitant of the defendant's conduct.' 3 The damage
question needs little discussion; as in all torts, it is a necessary element; here
usually attempted to be shown by proving a decline in sales. Since this often raises
difficult questions'of causation, and since recovery for injury to personal reputation
has been allowed under this theory,14 one who has been labelled "a seller of dirty
books" might conceivably recover on this latter point alone, assuming no justification can be shown. This tort theory was referred to in American Mercury v.
Chase,15 where the opinion surmised that the prima facie tort doctrine might ultimately be the leading theory upon which cases in this area would be decided.1"
The decision there was reached by analogy to secondary boycott, and a temporary
injunction was granted against the defendant, secretary of the famous (or
infamous) New England Watch and Ward Society. The court had before it the
issue of whether an unofficial organization, activated by a sincere desire to benefit
the public and to strengthen the administration of the law, might carry out its
purpose by threatening with criminal prosecution those who dealt in magazines
which it regarded as illegal. In holding that this was an unlawful practice,
whether the .threats were express or implied, the court said lack of commercial
iotive was immaterial; the defendant had no right to threaten. This the court
distinguished from an expression of views which is dearly an allowed and
protected right. The rationale of the decision was "that the injury did not flow
from the judgment of a court or public body.., defendant's judgment controls...
same result if judgment is right or wrong ...Reputable dealers won't risk it even
if they believe the prosecution is unfounded ... defendants know and trade on
this."'17 This decision has been criticized in some quarters as an invasion of the
freedom of speech,' 8 a problem always present in this area regardless of which
point of view one adheres to.
12. This concept was first put forth in Mongul Bteamship Co. v. McGregor,
Gow & Co. [1889] 23 Q. B. D. 598, 613 aff'd [1892] A. C. 25 and Introduced Into

this country by J. Holmes in Akins v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194 (1904). See note 52
COL. L. REv. 503 (1952); Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARe. L. REV. 1

(1894).

13. See Note, op. cit. supra note 12, at 506.
14. Id., at 509.

15. 13 F. 2d 224 (D. C. Mass. 1926).

16. Id., at 225.
17. Ibid., and New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F.

Supp. P. 823 832 (N. D. Ohio 1953).
18. 25 MVIc. L. REv. 74, (1926). At page 75 the author states: "It would seem
impracticable to stop private censorship unless we are ready to enjoin all
organized efforts of private persons to enforce the law."
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INJUNCTION
The three most recent cases have gone off on the injunction theory.19 The
Bantam Books and New American Library cases allowed the injunction but the
right to relief was denied in the New York case.20 These cases all involved the
action of a citizens' committee coupled with the cooperation of a law enforcement
officer. In Bantam Books the defendant was the prosecutor of pleas of Middlbury
County. He formed or accepted the services of an advisory committee whose
function it was to screen literature offered f6r sale in the county, to determine
if it was fit for public reading. A list was prepared and letters asking cooperation
were sent. The court in finding an implied threat of prosecution held that neither
the prosecutor nor the committee constituted by him had authority. "The action of
the defendant ... was illegal and beyond the scope of his official authority; he
violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of press." The Appellate Court,
however, narrowed the scope of the injunction to the one book contested in that
proceeding, though the reasoning of the lower court was not questioned.21 On
similar facts an injunction was also granted in the New American case,22 where
the court held the defendant by his actions had deprived the plaintiff of his
property without due process of law. The injunction was granted on the ground
that damage to the plaintiff, though incapable of being accurately measured, was
irreparable.2 3 In the course of its opinion the court said: "Where public officers
exceed their lawful powers they no longer act as agents of government. In such
cases they act with no greater legal authority than private persons or organizations.
Defendant possesses no power to suppress publications with the threat of prosecution." There an overt official-threat was involved, but the implication arises

19. Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N. J. Super. 292, 96 A. 2d. 47 (1953), modified
and affI'd 14 N. J. 524, 103 A. 2d 256, (1954). New American Library of World
Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. P. 823, 832 (N. D. Ohio 1953); Sunshine Book Co.
v. McCaffrey
Misc. , 112 N. Y. S. 2d 476 (1952); But (See also Burke
. (1955); motion to stay
v. Kingsby Books, 208 Misc. 150, 142 N. Y. S. 2d 735
granted, 309 N. Y. 781 130 N. Y. 2d 310 (1955). This case is to be distinguished
from the others as involved here was an action by law enforcement officers to
enjoin under statutory authority. N. Y. CODE CraM. PRoc. §22-a.
20. Sunshine Book v. McCafrey, supra note 18. The court here decided that
the Commissioner of licenses for New York City did not violate any constitutional
standards by sending a notice to distributors that revocation of licenses would be
forthcoming if they sold certain named magazines. Thus plaintiff's prayer for
injunction was denied. The theory of the court was that the doctrine of prior
restraint has no application in the area of obscene literature. This assumption is
questioned by Lockhart & McClure, op. cit. supra note 4.
21. 14 N. J. 524, 103 A 2d 256 (1954).
22. New American Library of World Literature v. Allen; 114 F. Supp. 823,
832 (N. D. Ohio 1953).
23. But see Marlin Fire Arms v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384K, 64 N. E. 163 (1902).
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that private organizations could also be enjoined. 24 On the basis of these cases" '
there seems to be ample authority to obtain an injunction.
OTHER THEORIES ON WHICH ACTIONS COULD BE BASED
Declaratory Judgment
There are other theories on which actions could be based. It has been
suggested that at the first sign of attack a declaratory judgment should be sought
so as to establish the legal status of the attacked book.2 This, of course, is expensive and slow. However, an action of this nature might conceivably be brought in
order to question the authority of power of the censorship group. This would
in essence, serve the same purpose as an injunction but its scope might be broader,
however, in that the defendant's rights could be fixed as to all possible plaintiffs
and not limited solely to the rights and obligations between the defendant censor
and the suing plaintiff. In addition, this would be less expensive than to test the
status of the questionable book and the constitutional question as to the place of
27
literature dealing with sex could be raised.
An action based on trade libel conspiracy might also be used. 28 Other potential methods for finally adjudicating the status of these books and their place in the
constitutional scheme, or for compensation based on damage caused may lie in a
suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act,29 or if public funds are being used, a
taxpayers' action, depending upon the law of a particular jurisdiction; an action
based upon malicious prosecution 3" may also lie.
Other suggestions such as legislation penalizing this type of attack on literature and laws to force invocation of the applicable ordinances have also been put
forth.3 ' A solution might also be in a ruling of the Supreme Court of the United
States giving constitutional protection to literature dealing with sex. This, it is
24. This reasoning can be questioned on the ground that the true rationale

for enjoining the defendant was that he was acting under color of authority and
thus the implication is defeated. But see note 8 supra;The question is then raised,
is actual color of right necessary or does a mere belief on the part of the party
Injured that the actor has such authority suffice?
25. See for additional authority 23 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 94 (1954) and
material there cited.
26.

See op. cit. supra,note 3.

27. See op. cit. supra,note 5.
28. Annot. 148 A. L. R. 853 (1944).
29. See op. cit. supra, note 3, at 497, n. 68, 69.
30. Halsey v. New York Soc. for Suppression of Vice, 234 N. Y. 1, 136, N. E.
219 (1922).
31.

10 THE

143 (1955).

REcoRD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
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thought, would do much to induce local authorities to pay less attention to pressure
groups.3 2 This latter thought coincides with the theory that private organizations
acting in the capacity of censors are within the reach of the fourteenth amendment,
in that they exercise powers similar to the state.8 3 These remedies appear to be
beyond the grasp of the ordinary dealer in books, however.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of others that this problem is insolvable and no method of
attaining relief is available at this point seems incorrect. However, the suggestions
put forth in this article are only suggestions, the ultimate solutions lie elsewherein the courage of book dealers and other citizens who in the last instance must
demand and defend their rights.
Joseph D. Mintz
ConstitutionalLaw: Fifth Amendment Privilege
Relator was held in contempt of court for refusing to answer, in spite of
immunity granted by the State, questions of a Louisiana Grand Jury investigating
public bribery. An indictment charging violations of a federal statute arising out
of alleged gambling activities was pending against him in a United States District
Court. Reversing the conviction, the Louisiana Supreme Court held (4-3), to
require answers concerning his gambling activities would violate his privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. State v.Dominguez,
228 LA. 284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955).
Article 1, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution grants an exemption from
compulsory self-incrimination "except as otherwise provided in this constitution . . ." The privilege is denied by Article 19, section 13, in bribery investigations but the compelled testimony "shall not afterwards be used against him in any
judicial proceeding . . ." Immunity is also provided for by statutory provisions
dealing with the subject matter of public bribery. Wyest's Louisiana Revised
Statute&, §§14:121, 15:468.
The questions which relator refused to answer sought to connect him with the
bribery of police officers during his operations of lotteries. Such testimony would
have been very pertinent to the pending federal prosecution which, of course,
could not be prevented by the State-granted immunity.
It is well settled that the fifth amendment is not applicable to the states.
32. LOCKIART & McCLuRE, op. cit. supra, note 5.
33. Note 61 HARv.L. REV. 344 (1948).

